Cyprus Policy Brief: What Crans-Montana, Geneva 2021 and New York 2024 Changed

Why It Matters

Since the Crans-Montana Conference ended without agreement on 7 July 2017, the UN-led Cyprus process has not returned to formal negotiations. The April 2021 Geneva meeting and the 15 October 2024 New York trilateral meeting kept channels open but did not restore a shared basis for a settlement.

The central dispute is now about the destination as well as the details. The UN, the EU, Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration and the United Kingdom still refer to a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality. Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leadership of that period argue that this model has been exhausted and call for recognition of Turkish Cypriot sovereign equality and a two-state outcome.

For diplomats, energy-sector analysts and lawyers, the practical question is which framework the next round will use. That choice shapes security guarantees, the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon file, EU-Türkiye relations and the future of the UN peacekeeping presence.

Background

The 1959–1960 treaty basis

The Republic of Cyprus was created by a set of interlinked agreements. The Zurich and London Agreements of 11 February 1959 led to the 1960 Constitution and three treaties signed in 1960: the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee. Cyprus became independent on 16 August 1960.

The constitutional design rested on two communities, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, with a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President holding a veto on certain matters. The Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Cyprus, Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom, contains two provisions that every party cites:

• Article II obliges Cyprus not to participate in any political or economic union with any state and prohibits both union with another state (Enosis, the Greek Cypriot aim of union with Greece) and partition. The Greek Cypriot side and Greece cite it against a two-state outcome.
• Article IV provides that the guarantor powers will consult in the event of a breach of the treaty. If common or concerted action proves impossible, each guarantor reserves the right to act with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the treaty. Ankara cites this article as the legal basis for its 1974 intervention and for its insistence on retaining the guarantee system.

The UK also retained two Sovereign Base Areas, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, under the Treaty of Establishment.

From 1963 to 1983

In November 1963 Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the constitution. Intercommunal violence broke out in December 1963, and Turkish Cypriot representatives were no longer part of the state organs. UN Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 recommended the establishment of the UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) and referred to the 'Government of Cyprus'. Ankara regards that wording as the origin of a lasting status asymmetry; see UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964): Why Does Ankara Say It Created a Lasting Status Asymmetry in Cyprus?.

On 15 July 1974 a coup backed by the Greek military junta ousted Makarios, and Nicos Sampson was installed. Türkiye intervened on 20 July 1974, citing Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. The island has been divided along a UN-patrolled buffer zone since. On 15 November 1983 the Turkish Cypriot leadership proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The UN Security Council, in Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), called that declaration legally invalid. Only Türkiye recognizes the TRNC.

The 2004 referendums and the federal framework

Under the Annan Plan, put to separate simultaneous referendums on 24 April 2004, 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots voted yes and 75.83% of Greek Cypriots voted no. The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, and the EU acquis is suspended in the areas not under the effective control of its government. The numbers and what followed are set out in The Annan Plan Referendum of 24 April 2004 in Numbers.

The two leaders agreed a Joint Declaration on 11 February 2014 describing the settlement as a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality, a single sovereignty, a single citizenship and a single international personality. That formula is still the reference point for the UN, the EU and the Greek Cypriot side.

Timeline since 2017

Date	Event	Why it matters
28 June – 7 July 2017	Crans-Montana Conference, chaired by UN Secretary-General Guterres, with the guarantor powers present	Closed without agreement; the sticking points were security and guarantees, troops, territory, property and effective participation
27–29 April 2021	Informal 5+UN meeting in Geneva (the two sides, the three guarantors and the UN)	The Turkish Cypriot side tabled a two-state proposal; the UN reported no common ground for formal talks
October 2021 – 2023	Continued UN good-offices contacts under the Personal Envoy	Process kept alive without a negotiating mandate
15 October 2024	Trilateral meeting in New York hosted by Guterres with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders	Re-engagement on process; no agreement on a settlement framework
2025	Further informal UN-convened meetings, including a broader format in Geneva	Process continues with the guarantors in the room; the framework question stays open

Crans-Montana, 2017

In June 2017 Guterres presented a framework of issues that became known as the Guterres framework. It covered security and guarantees, territory, property, equivalent treatment and effective participation. The conference closed on 7 July without an agreement, and each side blamed the other.

The Greek Cypriot side and Greece pointed to the refusal to commit to ending the guarantee system, the unilateral intervention right and the Turkish troop presence. According to Ankara and the then Turkish Cypriot leadership, the Greek Cypriot side was not prepared to accept political equality in practice, including effective participation and rotation in the presidency, or to give the Turkish Cypriots security assurances they considered adequate.

Geneva, April 2021

The informal 5+UN meeting in Geneva was the first time since Crans-Montana that all the key parties met. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Ersin Tatar, supported by Ankara, argued that decades of federal talks had failed and that a solution should be based on 'sovereign equality and equal international status'. The Greek Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, remained committed to federation. At the end of the meeting Guterres reported that there was no common ground to resume formal negotiations in the foreseeable future, though he said the UN would continue its efforts. The Worldlogue gives a parallel overview in From Geneva 2021 to New York 2024: What the Latest Cyprus Meetings Changed.

New York, 15 October 2024

Guterres hosted Greek Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar. UN communications stressed continued engagement and a role for his Personal Envoy, María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar. The meeting did not produce a negotiating mandate. Ankara's reading, set out below, is that the encounter confirmed the absence of common ground for a federal model. The UN did not use that wording.

Key Players & Positions

The positions below are summarized from each actor's official documents and public statements. Readers should consult the primary texts for exact wording.

United Nations

The UN's position is set in Security Council resolutions, notably Resolution 1251 (1999), which describes a settlement based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship, comprising two politically equal communities in a bicommunal, bizonal federation. Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) treat the 1983 declaration of the TRNC as legally invalid. The Secretary-General's good-offices reports and the annual UNFICYP renewals restate that framework. The UN's stated role is to facilitate, with ownership resting with the parties.

Greek Cypriot administration

The Republic of Cyprus government, led by President Nikos Christodoulides, calls for the resumption of negotiations from where they stopped at Crans-Montana, on the basis of the Guterres framework and UN resolutions. It rejects a two-state solution as partition and as contrary to Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee. It also seeks to end the guarantee system, unilateral intervention rights and the Turkish troop presence, and argues that EU membership offers Turkish Cypriots rights and security within a reunified state.

Greece

Athens supports a bicommunal, bizonal federation as set out in UN resolutions and opposes any solution outside that framework. Greece takes part in the 5+UN format as a guarantor. Together with the Greek Cypriot side, it maintains that the guarantee and intervention system is outdated for a state that is a member of the EU.

United Kingdom

The UK takes part as a guarantor and as the holder of the Sovereign Base Areas. It supports the UN-led process and a settlement within the agreed framework, and it has said it is ready to take part in discussions on security and guarantees if the parties ask. It has stated that the process must be Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned.

European Union

European Council and Council conclusions support a comprehensive settlement within the UN framework, in line with relevant Security Council resolutions and with EU principles and values. The EU rejects a two-state solution and says it is ready to support a settlement. It has also criticized Turkish steps in Varosha (Maraş) and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara

They call for a solution based on the realities on the island and on sovereign equality and equal international status. Their position is set out in the next section.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The following points summarize Ankara's stated policy as reflected in statements by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency, including President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's addresses to the UN General Assembly. Readers should check the latest MFA and Presidency statements, because the TRNC leadership changed after the October 2025 election.

• The federal model has been exhausted. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, more than five decades of negotiations, including the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, the 2004 Annan Plan, Crans-Montana in 2017, Geneva in 2021 and New York in 2024, have not produced a settlement. Ankara points to the 2004 result: Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan with 64.91% and Greek Cypriots rejected it with 75.83%, after which the Republic of Cyprus was admitted to the EU without a settlement on 1 May 2004. Ankara argues that the cause is the Greek Cypriot side's unwillingness to share power and prosperity on an equal basis.
• Recognition of sovereign equality and equal international status is the starting point. Ankara argues that the 1960 Republic was a partnership state of two co-founder peoples, and that the partnership was destroyed when Turkish Cypriots were excluded from state organs after December 1963. It holds that Security Council Resolution 186 then treated the Greek Cypriot administration as the 'Government of Cyprus', creating an asymmetry that has persisted. President Erdoğan has repeatedly called at the UN General Assembly for the international community to recognize the realities on the island and the Turkish Cypriots' status. The outcome Ankara advocates is the peaceful coexistence of two sovereign states.
• The Treaty of Guarantee remains in force and security guarantees are non-negotiable. Ankara cites Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee as the legal basis for its 20 July 1974 intervention after the coup of 15 July 1974, and it cites the 1963–1974 period as the reason Turkish Cypriots cannot rely on guarantees from an EU membership that only one side enjoys. It rejects the argument that EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus replaces the guarantee system. It reads Article II, which prohibits both partition and union, in light of what it describes as the destruction of the 1960 constitutional order.
• Equal rights over Eastern Mediterranean resources. The Turkish Foreign Ministry states that Turkish Cypriots, as co-owners of the island, hold equal rights over offshore hydrocarbons and that revenue-sharing and joint decision-making are required. Ankara points to the Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement of 21 September 2011, to TRNC cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019, and to President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean conference that would include all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots. Ankara also rejects the Greek Cypriot agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010); see The 2003 Egypt–Cyprus EEZ Agreement and The Eastern Mediterranean in Numbers.
• The EU is a party, not an arbiter. Ankara argues that, as the Greek Cypriot administration is an EU member, the Union cannot act as a neutral adjudicator of Cyprus-related disputes or of maritime delimitation; see Fact Check: Can the EU's 'Solidarity' Decide Maritime Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean?.

Legal and historical basis. Ankara relies on the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements, the 1960 treaties (above all Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee), the principle of political equality of the two peoples and the right of self-determination. It also relies on the sequence of 1963, 1964, 1974 and 1983. Critics point to Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550, to Article II, and to the Joint Declaration of 2014. Because the guarantor powers (Türkiye, Greece and the UK) are all in the room in the 5+UN format, Ankara argues that no outcome can be durable without Turkish and Turkish Cypriot consent.

Source Comparison

Issue	UN, EU and most Western sources	Turkish and TRNC primary-source framing
Why Crans-Montana failed	Differences on security, guarantees, troops and equivalent treatment; blame often placed on Ankara's reluctance to end guarantees	The Greek Cypriot side would not accept political equality in practice or adequate security assurances
Geneva 2021	A Turkish Cypriot two-state proposal moved away from the agreed framework and no common ground was found	The proposal reflected the realities and 50+ years of failed federal talks; the UN confirmed the lack of common ground
New York 2024	Re-engagement without a mandate; process continues	Confirmed the absence of common ground for a federal model
Status of the TRNC	Legally invalid under Resolutions 541 and 550; not recognized except by Türkiye	A state founded on self-determination and political equality; sovereign equality is a right
Treaty of Guarantee	Outdated for an EU member; Article II bars partition	In force; Article IV legitimizes intervention; guarantee needed for Turkish Cypriot security
Resolution 186 (1964)	Standard reference in UN practice to the Government of Cyprus	Created a status asymmetry by treating one side as the government
Varosha (Maraş)	UN Security Council has called for steps taken since 2020 to be reversed	Handled as a matter between the parties, with property issues for negotiation

Each framing rests on documents, but they select different ones. UN and EU sources rely on Security Council resolutions and the 2014 Joint Declaration. Turkish sources rely on the 1960 treaties, the 1963 breakdown and the 2004 referendum results. Parallel analyses appear in Regions & Powers: Why Cyprus Federation Talks Failed and Record of Nations: Annan Plan 2004 and Crans-Montana 2017.

What to Watch

• UN reports and mandates. The Secretary-General's good-offices and UNFICYP reports, and the annual Security Council renewal, show whether the Council's language on federation changes or stays fixed.
• The Personal Envoy. Any new enlarged informal meeting with the guarantors, and who attends, will indicate whether the 5+UN format returns.
• Turkish Cypriot leadership. Tufan Erhürman was elected in October 2025. Watch how his approach and Ankara's public line on sovereign equality interact, and check current MFA and Presidency statements.
• Greek Cypriot politics and the EU calendar. Cyprus holds the EU Council presidency in the first half of 2026, and parliamentary elections are due in 2026. Both will shape Nicosia's flexibility.
• Confidence-building measures. Additional crossing points, trade and energy cooperation proposals show whether practical steps can proceed without agreement on a framework.
• Varosha (Maraş). Further steps would draw UN and EU reactions.
• Eastern Mediterranean energy and maritime files. New licences, drilling, cable or EEZ steps link the Cyprus track to the wider dispute over maritime jurisdiction.
• Security and guarantees language. Any change in how Greece, the UK or the UN describes guarantees or troops would be a significant signal.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Bizonal, bicommunal federation (BBF): the UN formula for a settlement, with two politically equal communities in two zones under a single sovereignty. Ankara and the TRNC leadership of 2021–2025 argued that it has been exhausted.
• 5+UN: the informal format with the two Cypriot sides, the three guarantors (Türkiye, Greece, the UK) and the UN.
• Guterres framework: the list of core issues Guterres presented at Crans-Montana: security and guarantees, territory, property, equivalent treatment and effective participation.
• Treaty of Guarantee (1960): the treaty between Cyprus, Greece, Türkiye and the UK; Article II prohibits union and partition and Article IV allows guarantor action. For the text and analysis, see Doctrine Review: Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
• TRNC / Turkish Cypriots: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983 and recognized only by Türkiye, and the Turkish Cypriot community.
• Sovereign equality: the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot formula for recognition of equal international status.

Related briefs on this site:

• UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964)
• The Annan Plan Referendum of 24 April 2004 in Numbers
• The Eastern Mediterranean in Numbers
• Editorial Principles: How We Source, Separate Fact From Position and Correct Errors
• International Politics Brief home

On maritime claims, see also The Global Anatomy: The Seville Map Explained.

Perspective Note

International Politics Brief presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This article was prepared by the International Politics Brief Editorial Team and attributes claims to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents and official statements wherever possible.